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Millennium bcp – The Almond Hill Credit Extension 
Proposal 
 
Octávio Torino, a Director at the Millennium bcp’s Credit Department, glanced at the 
beautiful Sintra skyline as he walked through the skyway that connected the bank’s Tagus Park 
offices. It was a warm summer morning on the 14th of July 2011, and the director was heading 
towards a meeting he had requested himself with two other peers, Marco António, another 
Director from the Credit Department and Emílio Lépido, a manager from the Commercial 
Department. He was concerned about a loan extension decision the bank had to take and he felt 
that a meeting would be fundamental. 
Millennium bcp had been a success story in the Portuguese and European banking sector 
having become the largest privately held bank in Portugal, but in recent years it had faced some 
problems. Currently the main concerns stemmed from the European sovereign debt crisis, 
which was having an unprecedented impact on national banks. Portugal had requested 
financial support from the European Union and the future was nothing short of totally 
uncertain. 
The deal to be discussed in the meeting was a loan that 5 years before had been given to 
Almond Hill Construction Lda., a real estate development company that had recently felt the 
impact of a fall in the Portuguese real estate market and was consequently requesting an 
extension on the loan. The maturity date was arriving and the company would not be able to 
repay the loan, for the second year in a row. Torino believed that the issue was not as simple as 
it might seem at first glance. He had been thinking about the different options the bank could 
take and felt that this decision would reflect deeper issues for the bank. As he walked to the 
meeting he raised some questions in his head: 
Should we really extend this loan given that the most likely scenario is for the 
Portuguese economy and the real estate market to continue to deteriorate? Maybe it 
would not be insensible to try to recover as much value as we can through a recovery 
process. But what are the implications? Maybe the impact of such a decision might be 
bigger than we expect. And what does this say about our credit risk assessment models? 
 




Almond Hill Construction Lda. 
In 2004, José Santos Águas, a real state entrepreneur who until then had developed his 
business individually, joined António Simões and Domiciano Cavém to create Almond Hill 
Construction Lda. The company focused on building and promoting residential and non-
residential buildings in the Zona Oeste (a region north of Lisbon) and in the Algarve. The 
largest portion of the business though was residential housing in central Algarve, a highly 
touristic area. Águas started to progressively shift his individually developed real estate 
business to the company and had a 74% share in the company, while Simões had 25% and 
Cavém, 1%. 
The company experienced success in its first two years, especially 2006, with €13,1 million in 
revenue and a €975 thousand EBIT (see Exhibit 1 for company’s Financials). Demand was very 
strong, mainly from the English and Spanish markets, due to the high quality of construction 
and superb real estate location. 
There was, however, a different segment for which the ongoing central Algarve 
developments did not give answer. In 2006, Almond Hill Construction Lda. decided to invest in 
the development of smaller lower price range apartments for the English market, which would 
be marketed exclusively by the company and by a real estate promoting company with which 
Almond Hill Construction Ltd. worked. The development was to have 120 apartments in a 
private condominium – 16 T1, 86 T2 and 18 T3 – with ample gardens and both an adult and a 
children’s pool, only 15 minutes from the beach, in central Algarve. A market survey revealed 
that this type of product had good acceptance both in the Portuguese and in the Northern 
Europe markets. 
Managing partners José Águas and António Simões approached Millenium bcp’s Albufeira 
branch for the financing of the 37.579 m2 development that had been projected. They had high 
hopes for this enterprise. It had everything to be successful. 
 
Millennium bcp 
Before 1974, Portugal was under the rule of an authoritarian regime where free economic 
initiative was a mirage, especially in sectors such as banking where only a small number of 
families controlled existing private institutions. When the Carnation revolution overthrew the 
regime, socialist and communist groups took hold of the direction of the country and hence 
major sectors of the economy, including banking and insurance, were nationalized. Only in 
1982 did the country start to formally distant itself from the socialist ideological and political 
options that followed the revolution. As a result of the on-going negotiations for Portugal to 
join the European Economic Community (EEC), the first constitutional revision took place, 
making the economic system more flexible1. These changes, allowed two years later for the 
adoption of legislation that made it possible for private investors, foreign or domestic, to create 
private banks in Portugal. In 1985 the country finally became a member of the EEC. 
Immediately, a group of investor led by Mr. Américo Amorin and Mr. Jorge Jardim 
Gonçalves understood the opportunity that had presented itself to them and created in 1985 
Banco Commercial Português, the bank that in 2003 adopted the single brand “Millennium bcp” 
                                                          
1 http://www.parlamento.pt/RevisoesConstitucionais/Paginas/default.aspx, accessed in November, 2011. 
 




for all its different commercial brands. The vision of its leaders and the strategy adopted soon 
became a cornerstone in the Portuguese banking system’s evolution towards one of the most 
developed and innovative in Europe. The strategy for the new bank was very clear and for its 
future success three issues were fundamental. First, the bank’s founders defined the segments 
the bank should initially focus on and gave the utter most importance to those clients’ 
satisfaction. This was a vehicle to successfully enter the banking system and subsequently move 
into larger base client segments, which the bank did in an industry changing move with the 
creation of NovaRede. Second, but not least important, the bank realized it could gain 
significant present and future advantages through a proper information technology (IT) system, 
and it did. Finally, the implementation of a cross-selling strategy in 1987 helped put Millenium 
bcp in the path of unforeseen success. 
The bank continued to grow throughout the years both organically and through 
acquisitions, at the national level and internationally, becoming a well know success story and, 
not without some bumps along the way, the largest private bank in Portugal. On the 13th of 
March 2006 Millennium bcp, now led by Mr. Paulo Teixeira Pinto, made a tender offer to 
acquire Banco Português de Investimento (BPI) at a share price of €5,70. The offer was 
immediately rejected by BPI’s board of directors and the stage was set both for a “war” between 
the two banks and a conflict within Millenium bcp from which it never fully recovered. When 
the dust settled both banks had maintained their independence, but more was to come. 
First the bust of the U.S. housing market bubble hit the financial sector globally, Portugal 
included, and its subsequent effects on the global economy did not allow for a fast recovery. As 
the world thought it was starting to overcome the Great Recession a deeper crisis followed for 
European peripheral countries, the sovereign debt crisis. Greece, Ireland and finally Portugal 
were forced to ask the European Union and the International Monetary Fund for rescue plans 
and the impact on those countries’ financial institutions was tremendous2 (see Exhibit 3 for 
Millenium bcp senior debt CDSs3). The 2011 European Banking Authority (EBA) stress tests had 
revealed Millennium bcp’s €5,8 billion net exposure to Portuguese sovereign debt, €726,82 
million net exposure to Greek sovereign debt, and a €212,6 million net exposure to Irish 
sovereign debt. The bank passed the stress tests, but funding costs were soaring and additional 
pressure came from expectations that the EBA would soon make recommendations for 
European banks to increase their core tier one capital to a higher threshold. The future was 
uncertain. 
 
The credit lending process at Millennium bcp 
Basel II and its impact on the credit lending process 
Millennium bcp’s credit lending process had changed significantly in recent years, in light of 
the changes in the regulatory framework. The “International Convergence of Capital 
Measurement Standards – A revised framework”, which had been agreed upon, had the goal of 
guaranteeing the international convergence of legal frameworks concerning capital adequacy, 
the amount of capital that banks had to hold in relation to the assets they held, weighted by 
their risk. 
                                                          
2
 Committee on the Global Financial System. 2011. The impact of sovereign credit risk on bank funding conditions. CGFS 
Papers, No 43. Basel: Bank for International Settlements. 
3 CDS stands for Credit Default Swap, a bilateral contract for the coverage of credit default risk. 
 




Inexorably the accord and its further revisions and updates led banks to develop and 
improve their credit risk management. At Millennium bcp this need to implement better 
practices also became inevitable because of the banks growing credit business. The new 
practices introduced and the improvement of the rating systems allowed the institution to more 
rigorously and transparently evaluate the credit risk of its counterparties, to better collateralize 
credit operations, to develop a more efficient credit recovery process, and to have a more 
disciplined loan pricing policy. 
One of Basel II’s innovations was that it allowed banks to choose between two different 
broad methodologies for calculating their capital requirements for credit risk4. Banks could 
either continue using the Standardised approach (Exhibit 4) or they could, if authorized by the 
national regulator, make use of the Internal Ratings-Based approach (IRB). If they opted for the 
latter, the capital requirements for a given exposure would be determined by the banks own 
internal estimates of risk components – the probability of default (PD), the loss given default 
(LGD), the exposure at default (EAD) and effective maturity (M). Under IRB Foundation banks 
developed their own estimates of PD while for the remaining risk components they relied on 
the regulator’s estimates. On the other hand, under IRB Advanced banks could provide their 
own estimates of PD, LGD, EAD and their own calculation of M. In 2010, the Portuguese 
regulator, Banco de Portugal (BdP), after a long period of analyzing the request finally 
authorized Millennium bcp’s use of the IRB approach5 (see Exhibit 5 for Millennium’s 
approved capital requirements calculation methods and scope). However, for the real estate 
development segment, the bank was not authorized to use the IRB method. 
 
The lending process and loan pricing 
The starting point for Millennium’s credit lending process was the segmentation of the 
clients into distinct risk segments. This allowed the bank to use different measurement and 
credit control instruments for each macro segment or group of macro segments, including 
distinct formulas to calculate the capital needs for each operation (see Exhibit 6).  The results of 
the different rating models and methodologies for each risk segment could then be converted 
into a single common rating scale, through specific calibration methodologies. This common 
scale, the Master Rating Scale, allowed for a simple understanding and comparison of the credit 
risk of the clients belonging to the different risk segments (see Exhibit 7). 
Naturally the rating of a client could not be the only measure of credit risk. Each deal had its 
own characteristics and a loan could have elements and instruments of credit mitigation that 
other loans did not have, or that at least were different. Almost all of those instruments were 
either collateral or guarantees. For example, a loan that was collateralized by some type of real 
estate had obviously, ceteris paribus, less credit risk than a loan with no collateral or even than 
one also collateralized by real estate but with the collateral having substantial less value, since 
the former’s Loan-to-Value (LTV)6 would be lower. These credit risk mitigation instruments had 
an impact on the Loss Given Default (LGD) (see Exhibit 8 for collateral coverage table). 
The analysis allowed the bank to calculate the Basel II imposed capital requirements and 
therefore to determine the cost of capital (necessary for covering unexpected losses) for any 
                                                          
4 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. 2006. International Convergence of Capital Measurement Standards – A revised 
framework. Comprehensive version. pp 12-119. Basel: Bank for International Settlements. 
5 In Portugal this option had been established by Article 18 of Decree-Law No 104/2007 of April 3rd. 
6 Loan-to-value is the ratio between the value of the loan and the value of the collateral. 
 




given loan operation. This was done by multiplying the Weighted Average Cost of Capital 
(WACC) of the bank by the capital requirements (a function of PD, LGD and EAD). Also, the 
bank’s assessment of a client’s credit risk and loan protection level were fundamental for the 
bank to determine the expected cost of the credit risk (which covered expected losses), given by 
the product of the PD, LGD and EAD. With these costs computed, the Commercial 
Departments could more accurately price the loans. The bank recognized that this link between 
the risks and the price of the loans allowed it to be more competitive when considering better 
risks and to be more accurate when pricing risks of poorer quality. It was fundamental for the 
Commercial Departments to understand that in a competitive environment they could never 
lose site of the cost of covering the risks of each credit loan. The bank gave the following 
example: 
A Corporate client given a rating grade of 5 in the Master Rating Scale, with revenue 
above € 50 million, wishes to obtain a 5 year loan of €100 million, with no collateral, at a 
fixed rate. We have the following data: 
 Degree of risk: 5; 
 Protection level: 9; 
 5 year Transfer Rate: 4,45% 
 5 year liquidity cost: 120 basis points 
 WACC: 9,25% 
 Administrative costs: 40 basis points 
With this information the Commercial Area Information Management Department 
(DIGAC) can determine: 
 The cost of credit risk: 0,16%; 
 The capital requirements: 6,82%; 
 The cost of capital: 0,358% = 6,82% x (9,25% - 4,45%) 
 Minimum spread: 2,12% = 0,16% + 0,358% + 1,2% + 0,4% 
 Interest rate: 2,12% + 4,45% = 6,57% 
 
Four years in the life of a loan 
Approving a loan in 2006 
When the Albufeira branch of Millenium bcp’s Real Estate Investment bank7 (Banco de 
Investimento Imobiliário) was approached by Almond Hill for the financing of the new 
development, its managers were very pleased. It was yet another opportunity to reinforce 
the important relationship with these increasingly profitable clients, Almond Hill and 
Águas.  
The branch proposed internally the approval of a €10 million loan with a 1,125% spread 
over 3m EURIBOR (see Exhibit 9 for EURIBOR rates), a 4 year maturity and an initial 
available amount of €1 million. Following availability of the full €10 million would depend 
on the evolution of the development, with inspections from the bank. Also, principal 
                                                          
7
 Banco de Investimento Imobiliário was a wholly owned subsidiary of Millennium bcp, created in 1992 through a 
partnership with an Italian savings bank that focused on real estate investment loans. 
 
 




repayment would be made with each deed signed by the promissory purchaser and the loan 
was guaranteed by first mortgage on the real estate and improvements, free of covenants and 
and encumbrances (see Exhibit 11 for further data on the development). 
After the proposal was analyzed by the South Construction Credit Division (Crédito à 
Construção Sul), with positive feedback, the division sent it to the Credit Commission 
(Comissão de Crédito do BII) for approval8. All of the relevant information was given (see 
Exhibits 10 and 11). According to the branch, a competing bank had recently entered the 
business with competitive prices, and for the proposal under analysis it had already presented 
its conditions, with a 1,25% spread and  a potential reduction to 1%. Moreover, the branch 
expressed its concern with the competition of yet another bank, which had been trying to enter 
Almond’s business. They were also worried with the displeasure the company had shown 
regarding up-front commissions. 
Regarding Almond Hill’s partners, the division emphasized that all of them were good 
clients of the group, Águas in particular. The main partner had at the time two real estate loans 
with the group, one of €1.300.00 and the other €400.000, both with a 2% spread and the first 
already being repaid. A third loan of €1.469.394 had already been fully repaid. Moreover, the 
division recognized both in Almond Hill and Águas high skills as real estate promoters, as well 
as top quality developments.  
The loan was approved with the spread set at 1,375%, in line with the Construction Credit’s 
Management suggestion. In fact at the time, in Portugal as well as in other countries (Ireland 
being the most obvious) these types of loans were very easily approved. Credit was cheap, 
housing prices kept rising and competition was fierce between banks. 
 
A credit tsunami and the world in shock 
In 2007, after a long period of low interest rates, the world saw the bust of the U.S. housing 
market bubble and its contagion of financial markets through derivatives such as MBSs and 
CDOs9. In the same year the Irish housing market collapsed, but it was in 2008 that we saw a 
severe drop in housing prices across the globe (See Exhibit 12 for global real house prices data) 
as well as the infamous fall of mighty Lehman Brothers. Following this global shock, home 
prices started to rebound in 2009. “On average, prices fell about 17 per cent across the world in 
2007 and 2008, but have since bounced back by about 10 per cent.”10 However, it was soon clear 
that the strong increase in global housing prices might not last. Dan Thomas, property 
correspondent for the Financial Times, explained the problem: 
It’s difficult to see there being quite as much growth as there has been over the last 
year, you know, in very broad terms across the world. Low interest rates clearly have 
been a massive factor in that recovery and now, although that might not change 
overnight or might not change this year, eventually that will have to see some sort of 
movement. At the same time you’re seeing in countries like the U.K., government tax 
increases, and spending cuts, likely to have an impact on unemployment and that means 
                                                          
8 Information is limited regarding the bank’s credit lending process in 2006. The case focuses mainly on the same 
process in 2010 and 2011, which evolved from and is more sophisticated than the one in 2006. Therefore, the South 
Construction Credit Division and the Credit Commission do not appear further in the case. 
9 MBS stands for Mortgage Backed Security and CDO stands for Collateralized Debt Obligation. 
10 Knight Frank, as cited by Thomas, Daniel. “House prices face rollercoaster ride”. August 15, 2010. Financial Times. 
 




that there will be fewer people to buy homes or as expensive homes, at least, which is 
bound to have an impact on house prices. More broadly there are countries which are still 
suffering some fairly large problems in oversupply, the U.S. has a big oversupply 
problem, but also, countries like Spain, Dubai, Ireland and other places around the world 
where overbuilding got a bit too exuberant in the boom are now just having to 
fundamentally reprice, I suppose11. 
 
Portugal and the Algarve 
For Portugal the story had been slightly different. Contrary to the rest of the world’s 
extraordinary increase in housing prices, fuelled by cheap credit, Portuguese residential 
housing real price growth in the last decade had been shy (see Exhibit 13 for data on the 
Portuguese residential housing market). 
In 2003 strong growth was observed, however, in the following year residential housing 
prices saw almost no growth and from then on started to decline (in real terms) until in 2008 
they fell by 8,61%. The following year, a year of deflation, real prices bounced back by 3,19%, 
but immediately in 2010, amidst a tough period of structural changes in Portugal, real 
residential housing prices fell again, by 5,55%. The sovereign debt crisis kicked in and the 
country was doing everything to avoid the same faith as that of Greece and Ireland. Along with 
this decline in prices, the number of new completed residential houses started to decline every 
year, from a peak of 46.579 in 2002 to a 15 year low of 20.082. 
One of the country’s regions with the highest residential housing value per m2 alongside 
Lisbon, the capital, is the Algarve. It is the southernmost region of the continental part of the 
country, kwon for its good weather and unparalleled coastline, the reason why Portuguese and 
foreigners flock to its beaches, mainly in the summertime, but also in leisure periods throughout 
the year. These particular characteristics have shaped its housing market into one mostly of 
second homes, turning it into one of the most expensive regions per m2. 
Algarve nominal housing prices stalled in 2007, one year after the country’s housing prices 
did, translating into a real decline of 2,51%. From 2008 to 2010, Algarve real housing prices 
continued to fall, decreasing in 2008 by 6,35%, again decreasing in 2009 by merely 0,5% and 
following the trend the following year, with a 3,77% drop in real prices. 
 
A canary in a coal mine 
As July 26, 2010 approached and with it the maturity of the loan, Almond Hill, aware of its 
likely inability to fully repay its debt, considering the developments in the Algarve housing 
market, requested a one year extension of the maturity. 
The development had been fully completed that year and the company was now focusing on 
the sale of the apartments. In spite of having already sold 58 out of the 120 apartments, 20 in 
2010, the number was below expectations, for Almond Hill planned by then to have made 
enough sales so to fully repay the loan. The real estate development company predicted that 
during the summer, when demand was higher, it would be able to overcome this adverse 
                                                          
11 Daniel Thomas, “Outlook for global property unclear” Financial Times, video, August 16, 2010. 
 




scenario by selling a large number of the remaining available apartments. In light of this a 
request for a one year extension of maturity was made. 
At Millennium bcp this type of credit decisions had to pass through 2 or 3 levels of decision, 
decision, depending on the importance of the deal, and at each level it was common to have 
more than one opinion. The branch analyzed the request and sent it to the South Real Estate 
Promotion Department (Direcção de Promoção Imobiliária Sul) with the favorable opinion of 
extending the maturity of the loan until July 26, 2011. According to the new credit lending rules 
Almond Hill was given a risk note of 11 under the recently adopted Master Rating Scale. The 
outstanding amount of the loan was now €4.658.060 and the PVT12 was €10.994.500, which 
meant a LTV of 42,37%. 
Following the branch’s assessment and positive feedback, the Credit Department intervened. 
It produced a Credit Report where the location of the development and the eventual favorable 
marketing conditions in the summer were underlined. The report also reinforced the 
recommendation of closely following the company’s fiscal situation, as had been practice, and 
emphasized the fact that until then all credit obligations had been dully met. Overall, the report 
concluded that in lack of a better alternative the extension should be approved, as long as all 
due interest continued to be paid. The recommendation of the Credit Report was followed and 
the extension was authorized by the Credit Department. At this point, the South Real Estate 
Promotion Department of the Commercial Department set the spread at 3,75%. 
 
 The second big wave 
Temperatures had been high that day in Portugal and a glimpse of the sun could still be seen 
in the horizon, an early announcement of the summer that was only a couple of months away. 
But as the warm evening of the 6th of April 2011 gradually set in, the weight of the news that the 
Prime-Minister was addressing the country at 8 p.m. increased. People across the country knew 
what the head of government was announcing. Almost three minutes into the speech 
expectations became reality. 
The government decided today to ask the European Union for financial help. 
For the last months, the Portuguese had been anticipating a bailout and most did not believe 
that the country would overcome the sovereign debt crisis without one. Yields on government 
short and long-term debt had been soaring for quite some time now and, to combat this, 
government had introduced a series of austerity measures that were bound to turn the 
country’s sluggish growth into yet another recession and that bolstered public discontent and 
protest, although not remotely comparable to recent events in Greece (see Exhibit 14 for 
Generic Portuguese government bond rates). 
Some called the previous decade a lost one for the Portuguese economy and the near future 
shed a gloomy shade over the country. A deep recession was expected in 2011, unemployment 
was rising and the economic climate and confidence indicators were falling (see Exhibits 15 for 
data on the Portuguese economy). When the Portuguese government reached and agreement 
with the European Union and the International Monetary Fund for a €78 billion rescue plan on 
the 3rd of May 2011, the goal was to reduce the public deficit from 9,1% in 2010 to 5,9% that year. 
                                                          
12 PVT is the Assumed Transaction Value (Presumível Valor de Transacção). It is the assessed value of the real estate 
after the development has been completed. 
 




With the July 5th elections a majority arose from the poles and the conditions were set to 
implement the structural changes that Portugal needed to finally develop a sustainable path for 
future growth. Only two months after the public scrutiny, Moody’s, a credit rating agency, 
decided to reduce the Portuguese rating by four notches to Ba2. As the recently elected Prime-
Minister prepared to enter a meeting, news cameras caught the head of government 
commenting on the credit agency’s decision, “It’s a stomach punch, isn’t it?” 
 
The problem 
A full year had almost passed as Águas set in front of his computer reading once more 
the letter he so carefully wrote before pressing “print” with a sigh. Almond Hill had 
underperformed again and a formal request had to be sent to the Millenium bcp branch for 
the second extension of the loan . Forty eight months had been the initially agreed duration 
of the loan that had now been outstanding for sixty months and had a spread of 3,25%. Only 
9 apartments had been sold that year, less than half the sales in 2010, and only two more 
deed signings had been scheduled, leaving an outstanding loan of € 3.821.040 and a LTV of 
40,79%. 
Analyzing the request from Águas, the branch believed that the extension should be 
granted given that the development and loan were of a significant size and again believing 
that the summer would bring a higher demand for this type of product. Moreover, the real 
estate development company was by far the most profitable client of the branch and had 
always paid due interests in time. Nevertheless, the branch recognized that sales were very 
much below expectations and in the opinion it sent to the South Real Estate Promotion 
Department it informed that pressure was being put on the client to reduce prices to more 
competitive levels, presumably allowing for a higher rate of sales in the summer. 
Following the branches recommendation, again the first to analyze the proposal and to 
give an opinion was a credit analyst at the Credit Department.  He produced a Credit Report 
were all loans, guarantees and collateral from Almond Hill and its partners were analyzed. 
The credit analyst concluded that in lack of a better option the loan should be extended for 
the second time, as long as all due interest in the amount of €40 thousand were paid and an 
overdraft of €22 thousand that existed on two deposit accounts was covered. This decision 
received approval both at decision level 1 and 2 of the Credit Department and was sent to 
Mr. Octávio Torino, a decision level 3 Director from the same department who carefully 
looked at the credit Report and all previous history of the deal.  He was uneasy about the 
bank’s situation, the Portuguese economy and real estate market condition but gave his 
approval and sent it to Mr. Marco António for a second intervention at decision level 3. 
Having the approval of both, the request was finally sent to the South Real Estate Promotion 
Department of the Commercial Department where Mr. Emílio Lépido gave his 
authorization, repricing the loan with a 5,5% spread. 
Not 48 hours after the 11th of July 2011 decision to extend the loan, the branch informed 
the Credit Department that Águas, unable to meet the company’s financial obligations 
because of the low rate of sales, was also requesting a 180 day extension of the interest that 
were due. The two scheduled deed signings had been delayed and hence Almond Hill could 
not pay the interest on time. The credit analyst was unfavorable to the request and instead 
proposed that firstly, the interest payment was deferred at a maximum by 90 days, secondly, 
that on the signing of the two deeds scheduled, on top of the agreed amortization of the loan 
 




the bank should receive, in each deed signed, an amount of 50% of the interest now extended, 
and finally that this should be conditioned by the definite cover of the overdraft. 
The credit analyst’s proposal received the consent of decision levels 1 and 2 at the Credit 
Department but when Mr. Torino received the recommendation his unrest regarding the 
situation of this particular client led him to believe that the problem should be discussed with 
his peers. He believed that the complexity and context of the matter required an open 
discussion. He picked up his telephone and called both Mr. António and Mr. Lépido for a 
meeting that morning. 
 
The meeting 
The three managers from Millenium bcp calmly sat down in the meeting room, but many 
were the concerns on Torino’s mind regarding the loan under analysis. The real estate market 
condition in Portugal seemed to be deteriorating and the sovereign debt crisis was having an 
enormous impact in the country. “Gentleman, these are not common times” Torino said, “We 
know the bank is struggling because of the country’s situation and all our decisions have to be 
carefully scrutinized. The Algarve house prices continue to fall and the situation is not likely to 
get better for some time. Almond Hill, that already has a rating grade of 11 in our internal scale, 
is going through a bumpy road that only seems to be getting worse. Is it really the best option to 
extend the loan and push the problem one year further? Should we not take action and try to 
immediately recover as much value as we can before things get any worse?” 
Lépido listened quietly and with interest, but he could not help to feel differently and see the 
problem from another perspective. “Look, Octávio, if it is eventually true that we are facing a 
rapid deterioration of the real estate market, it is also true that the best people to push these 
products at the best conditions possible for us are the promoters. They did a fabulous job until 
the shockwaves of the global crisis started hitting and we have already started to put pressure 
on them to make prices more competitive so that this summer we can see an increase in sales.” 
The Commercial Department manager was also concerned with the Portuguese justice 
system’s well known inefficiency, “What would be the alternative? How much value would we 
actually be able to recover if we initiated a recovery process? Let us not forget that according to 
recent numbers the average executive law suit duration has been increasing and is now at about 
43 months. More than 50% of the suits last 4 or more years and 6% of them last more than 8 
years. These are worrying numbers. Also, the development is focused primarily on foreign 
demand, mainly from the Spanish and English markets, which presumably have not been 
suffering as much as domestic demand.” 
Most points seemed to be valid, but Torino was not yet convinced, he did not believe that a 
decrease in foreign demand would not be an issue. “Spain was these last years an important 
growing market for the tourism in Algarve and they are also struggling with a sovereign debt 
crisis. Moreover, Ireland is another important market, as well as the United Kingdom and both 
countries are facing problems, albeit in different dimensions. The Tourism of Portugal (Turismo 
de Portugal) has recently used data from a 17% drop in Spain of English tourists that opt to stay 
in their own apartments to suggest that a similar sharp drop in Portugal may also be seen. It is 
not obvious that Almond Hill will be able to swim against this tide.” There was another 
concern, “And we all know that the more a company starts to get into a distress area the more 
 




likely it is for its management to take on more risks, which may be very harmful for us. Is it 
sensible to allow that to happen?” 
António had been standing in the sideline of the discussion and he knew that both his 
coworkers were making valid points, but other issues had to be put on the table, “This is 
unquestionably a sensitive matter. If we are to not extend the loan and instead initiate a 
recovery process and in that scenario Emílio is right, are the true risks higher than what is 
reflected in the LGD we have attributed to this loan? As you know, the LGD is computed 
based on realized LGD’s, which reflect historical values. It is true that ultimately we 
carefully try to determine long-run forward-looking recovery rates, but are the conservative 
estimates we are using giving us an actual “downturn LGD”? 
This had not escaped Torino’s mind. What impact could this adverse scenario have on 
the bank? If our models are generating LGD estimates on real estate loans that do not reflect 
an actual downturn scenario, given the recent political and economic situation of the 
country, what will the impact on the bank be? 
The three men looked at each other as they tried to reach a solution that was not clear. 
Although it did not have the weight of the complicated loans with relatively large amounts, 
the decision they had to take felt like it reflected deeper issues for Millennium bcp. Should 
the bank grant another extension, knowing that there is little hope that Almond Hill's sales 
will improve in the next couple of years or should they deny such extension, repossess the 
collateral, find out how little these assets are worth on a distressed sale, and recognize a loss 
on the bank's accounts? 
 




Exhibit 1 Almond Hill Construction Ltd. Financials 
 
 







2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Income Statment
Revenue 13.094.750,00 2.134.500,00 6.529.500,00 3.662.500,00 12.003.100,00
Changes in inventories -570.504,07 10.881.369,83 5.833.485,53 2.462.561,26 -7.923.398,90
Cost of Goods Sold 7.009.407,00 7.289.361,39 4.655.576,68 1.795.682,34 1.213.977,53
Supplies and services 2.755.325,36 4.170.481,26 3.960.103,24 2.270.701,96 2.041.519,78
Personnel costs 381.893,02 693.914,15 629.760,75 449.110,88 422.726,46
Other operating income 35.040,06 41.798,97 14.807,11 324.988,37 442.624,24
Other operating costs 1.278.390,36 162.295,34 1.251.086,42 193.209,95 191.372,96
EBITDA 1.134.270,25 741.616,66 1.881.265,55 1.741.344,50 652.728,61
D&A 159.611,56 139.426,98 144.133,29 144.610,68 63.936,88
EBIT 974.658,69 602.189,68 1.737.132,26 1.596.733,82 588.791,73
Interest expenses 147.146,82 296.635,17 947.142,22 810.305,78 529.393,10
EBT 827.511,87 305.554,51 789.990,04 786.428,04 59.398,63
Taxes 499.645,52 111.591,28 499.680,76 251.188,79 48.198,21
Net income 327.866,35 193.963,23 290.309,28 535.239,25 11.200,42
Balance Sheet
Cash and equivalents 162.059,81 N/A 14.112,34 63.255,81 64.049,45
Fixed Assets 442.754,24 344.113,71 230.217,92 116.518,84 53.026,96
Total Assets 10.708.008,49 25.335.701,04 33.822.745,30 35.355.102,59 26.724.778,19
Short-term debt 3.174.978,89 5.747.877,99 9181949,26 6.971.549,11 7.675.948,68
Long-term debt 6.632.664,98 15.701.807,64 20.648.736,41 22.464.120,35 12.679.325,96
Gross debt 9.807.643,87 21.449.685,63 29.830.685,67 29.435.669,46 20.355.274,64
Net debt/(cash) 9.645.584,06 N/A 29.816.573,33 29.372.413,65 20.291.225,19
Retained earnings -27.501,73 3.075.658,86 N/A 1.392.134,25 1.831.004,25
Shareholder's equity 900.364,62 3.886.015,41 3.992.059,63 5.919.433,13 6.369.503,55
Profitability
EBITDA Margin 8,7% 34,7% 28,8% 47,5% 5,4%
EBIT Margin 7,4% 28,2% 26,6% 43,6% 4,9%
Net Margin 2,5% 9,1% 4,4% 14,6% 0,1%
Return on Equity 36,4% 5,0% 7,3% 9,0% 0,2%
Capital Structure
Total debt to common equity 10,9 5,5 7,5 4,97 3,20
Net debt to common equity 10,7 N/A 7,5 4,96 3,19
Total debt to EBITDA 8,65 28,92 15,86 16,90 31,18
Net debt to EBITDA 8,50 N/A 15,85 16,87 31,09
Debt Protection
EBIT to interest expense 6,62 2,03 1,83 1,97 1,11
EBITDA to interest expense 7,71 2,50 1,99 2,15 1,23
 

























































(1) The scope of the IRB approach and Internal Models is limited to the exposures is the 
perimeter managed centrally from Portugal, excluding the Standard method of 
operational risk, which adoption was authorised in 2009 for application on a consolidated 
basis. 
(2) Exposures derived from the real estate promotion segment and simplified rating 
system, while belonging to the company risk category, are weighted by the Standardized. 
 





Credit Assessment AAA to AA- A+ to A- BBB+ to BBB- BB+ BB- B+ to B- Below B- Unrated
Sovereigns 0% 20% 50% 150% 100%
Banks 20% 50% 50% 150% 50%
Corporates 20% 50% 100%
Retail
Claims secured by residential property









IRB as of 31/12/2010
CREDIT RISK AND COUTERPARTY CREDIT RISK
Retail
Loans secured by residential or commercial real estate IRB Advanced
   Small companies IRB Advanced
   Other loans Standardised
Companies IRB Foundation (2)
Other loans and advances Standardised
MARKET RISKS
Debt instruments Internal Models
Equity securities Internal Models




















Source: Millennium bcp documents 
 
 












Source: Millennium bcp documents 
 







Real Estate Promotion Projects and Real Estate Investment Funds
Start-up companies
SPV, ACE, churches, sports clubs, other non-profit organisations, small 
businesses w/ less than 2 years activity, microcredit clients, Holding 





Real Estate Promotion companies
Holding companies
Operational subsidiary companies (ACE)
Small Businesses
Smal Businesses
TRIAD for Small-businesess 
and/or specific acceptance 
Private Customers Private Costumers
TRIAD for private and/or specific 
product scoring models




Corporate and SME Corporate Corporat Model
Rating based on External Rating 
Agencies
Rating based in internal 
regulation (Credit Regulation)




1 0,01% 0,03% 0,05% Maximum safety (only sovereign)
2 0,05% 0,05% 0,07% Superior quality
3 0,07% 0,10% 0,14% Very high quality
4 0,14% 0,20% 0,28% High quality
5 0,28% 0,40% 0,53% Very good quality
6 0,53% 0,70% 0,95% Good quality
7 0,95% 1,30% 1,73% Average high quality
8 1,73% 2,30% 2,92% Average quality
9 2,92% 3,70% 4,67% Average Low quality
10 4,67% 5,90% 7,00% Low quality
11 7,00% 8,30% 9,77% Very low quality
12 9,77% 11,50% 13,61% Restricted credit
13 13,61% 16,10% 27,21% Soft signs of impariment
14 27,21% 46,00% 100,00% Strong signs of impairment
15 100,00% 100,00% 100,00% Default

















Source: Millennium bcp documents 
 
 
Exhibit 9 EURIBOR rates 
 
EURIBOR 12m   EURIBOR 6m   EURIBOR 3m 
























































Protection level Financial colateral (1) Other colateral Implicit LGD
Residential Commercial
Non productive / non 
residential
1 ≥ 100% 2,5%
2 ≥ 70%, < 100% ≥ 150% 10,0%
3 ≥ 60%, < 70% ≥ 130%, < 150% 15,0%
4 ≥ 50%, < 600% ≥ 110%, < 130% ≥ 145% 20,0%
5 ≥ 40%, < 50% ≥ 100%, < 110% ≥ 120%, < 145% ≥ 120% 24,0%
6 ≥ 30%, < 40% ≥ 80%, < 100% ≥ 100%, < 120% ≥ 100%, < 120% ≥ 120% 28,0%
7 ≥ 20%, < 30% ≥ 60%, < 80% ≥ 75%, < 100% ≥ 80% ,< 100% ≥ 90%, < 120% 32,0%
8 ≥ 10%, < 20% ≥ 40%, < 60% ≥ 50%, < 75% ≥ 60%, < 80% ≥ 60% < 90% 36,0%
9 < 10% < 40% < 50% < 60% < 60% 40,0%
Real Estate Colateral
Colateral coverage (colateral / exposure)
(1) Adjusted collateral value
Note: Colateral coverage is the inverso of LTV
 




Exhibit 10 Almond Hill Construction Lda. outstanding credit (in €)   Exhibit 11 Almond Hill Construction Lda. Financing proposal 
            
Outstanding credit (€)         
          
Real Estate Investment Bank   w/ mortgage Available limit 
Current 
balance 
Approved   5.200.000 4.162.340 2.154.340 
Under analysis   2.000.000 2.000.000 0 
Proposed   10.000.000 10.000.000 0 
Total     16.162.340 2.154.340 
Commercial     44.000 44.000 
          
BCP Group Total     16.206.340 2.198.340 
          
Banking industry (including BCP Group) as of November 
2005   4.636.119 
 
Almond Hill Construction Lda.
Algarve
Construction Area Construction costs
m2 €/m2 €
Bellow ground:
Basement 6.377 300 1.913.100
Above gorund:
Housing 12.203 600 7.321.800
Terrace and balconies 3.684 250 921.000
Pools 152 450 68.400
Above ground total 16.039 8.311.200




Simple parking 18.500 120 2.220.000
Total parking 2.220.000
Type €/m2 No.
T1 105.000 16 1.680.000
Housing T2 165.000 86 14.190.000
T3 182.500 18 3.285.000




Real estate 3.330.000 16%
Construction 11.225.000 53%
Planning 1.753.000 8%
Gross margin 5.067.000 24%
PVT 21.375.000
Current PVT 3.330.000
Maximum eventual risk 13.975.000
Proposed financing
INITIAL FINAL MER
Ammount 1.000.000 10.000.000 13.975.000
LTV 30% 47% 65%
 




Exhibit 12 Global real house price index and unweighted global average house price change 
 












Source: Mckinsey Quarterly, October 2009 
 











Source: Global House Price Index Q2 2011, Knight Frank. 
 
 




Exhibit 13 Portuguese residential Housing Market, 1995 through 2011 
















Housing nominal change (%) 
 
 





Source: Instituto Nacional de Estatística 
 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Portugal dwellings -0,19% 10,29% 3,08% 2,34% 0,64% -1,17% -7,90% 3,09% -3,17% -2,39%
Houses 3,37% 9,96% 6,34% 5,53% 2,25% -0,66% -11,01% 0,78% -1,16% 1,37%
Flats -1,90% 11,58% 1,50% 0,91% -0,93% -1,89% -4,75% 3,08% -3,39% -4,01%
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Portugal housing 1065 1063 1172 1209 1237 1245 1230 1133 1168 1131
Houses 890 920 1012 1076 1135 1161 1153 1026 1034 1022
Flats 1159 1137 1269 1288 1299 1287 1263 1203 1240 1198
Dec-2010 Jan-2011 Feb-2011 Mar-2011 Apr-2011 May-2011 Jun-2011
Portugal housing 1131 1133 1139 1151 1154 1149 1128
Houses 1022 1026 1034 1052 1063 1067 1053
Flats 1198 1199 1203 1210 1208 1198 1177
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Portugal dwellings -4,04% 7,76% 0,58% -0,27% -1,78% -3,73% -8,61% 3,19% -5,55%
Houses -0,62% 7,43% 3,75% 2,84% -0,21% -3,24% -11,70% 0,88% -3,59%
Flats -5,68% 9,01% -0,96% -1,66% -3,31% -4,44% -5,48% 3,18% -5,76%
 





















Housing nominal price change (%) 
 
 





Source: Instituto Nacional de Estatística 
 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Algarve housing 7,20% 13,05% 3,74% 1,33% 5,95% 0,09% -5,62% -0,60% -1,35%
Houses 9,44% 17,00% 2,29% 3,16% 11,69% 0,41% -8,98% -1,33% 1,14%
Flats 5,42% 12,27% 4,17% 0,86% 4,10% 0,32% -4,90% -0,34% -2,44%
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Algarve housing 1167 1251 1414 1467 1487 1575 1577 1488 1479 1459
Houses 1091 1194 1397 1429 1474 1647 1653 1505 1485 1502
Flats 1199 1264 1419 1478 1491 1552 1557 1481 1476 1440
Dec-2010 Jan-2011 Feb-2011 Mar-2011 Apr-2011 May-2011 Jun-2011
Algarve housing 1459 1450 1430 1440 1441 1456 1429
Houses 1502 1492 1438 1460 1480 1492 1456
Flats 1440 1431 1427 1432 1425 1441 1417
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Algarve housing 3,06% 10,46% 1,22% -1,25% 3,41% -2,51% -6,35% -0,50% -3,77%
Houses 5,22% 14,31% -0,19% 0,53% 9,01% -2,20% -9,68% -1,23% -1,34%
Flats 1,35% 9,69% 1,64% -1,71% 1,60% -2,28% -5,63% -0,24% -4,83%
 













































































































Millennium bcp – The Almond Hill Credit Extension 
Proposal 




In July 2011, Octávio Torino, a Millenium bcp Director from the Credit Department requested a 
meeting with two of his peers, one from the same department and the other from the 
Commercial Department, to discuss a credit extension to Almond Hill Construction Lda., a real 
estate development company. The company had been given a €10 million loan in 2006, with a 4 
year maturity, for a development in a highly touristic Portuguese region. Since then, the real 
estate developer had felt the impact of the 2007/2008 financial crisis and subsequently of the 
European sovereign debt crisis. Its performance deteriorated and it was forced to request two 
extensions of the loan, one in 2010 and again in 2011. In the middle of the uncertainty European 
banks were facing, Torino had to decide on whether to approve the second extension of the loan 
or to initiate a credit recovery process. 
TEACHING OBJECTIVES 
The case provides an opportunity to understand the credit lending process and loan pricing 
policy in a major bank and to explore the issues and interests at play when a relevant credit 
decision must be taken. Readers will be confronted with a problem that cannot be addressed 
simply from a purely technical perspective and where different viewpoints, such as the client 
relationship and the risk-management ones, may clash. Also, the case underscores the 
constraints banks may face when opting for a recovery process and shows the importance of the 
economic context in this type of decision.  
 
António Preto prepared this case under the supervision of Professor Paulo Pinho as part of the 
requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Finance from the NOVA – School of Business and 
Economics. The identities of the companies and individuals concerned in this case have been disguised, 
except for the identity of the bank Millennium bcp. Only the three Millennium bcp directors, their 






SUGGESTED ASSIGNMENT QUESTIONS 
1. Loan pricing at Millennium bcp 
a. How did the DIGAC compute the cost of risk and the capital requirements in 
the example given on page 5 of the case? (See Notice No. 5/2007 from the Banco 
de Portugal (BdP) - Aviso do BdP nº 5/2007) 
 
2. The Almond Hill real estate loan 
a. Analyze the loan. Are a bank’s Basel II models sufficient for that analysis? 
 
3. Extending the maturity of the loan vs. initiating the recovery process 
a. Should the bank initiate a credit recovery process? Why or why not? 
b. What might be the consequences of initiating this process? 
c. Which factors do you think are having an impact on this decision? 
ANALYSIS 
1. Loan pricing at Millennium bcp 
Computing the cost of risk and capital requirements for loan pricing 
The cost of risk is calculated simply by multiplying the PD and the LGD. 
                  (1) 
 
We know that the corporate client’s degree of risk is 5, so we can check the Rating Master Scale 
on Exhibit 7 of the case and find that the midpoint PD for that rating grade is 0,40%. Also, we 
know that the protection level is 9, which allows us to find the implicit LGD on the table in 
Exhibit 8 of the case; 40%. With this information we can arrive at the cost of credit risk. 
 
 
As for the capital requirements, we need to check the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision’s International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards document as 
well as the Portuguese regulator’s Notice No. 5/2007. With these, we find that in order to find 
the capital requirements (2), Millennium bcp must compute the risk weight (3) for this 
operation. 
                  
       (2) 
 
                   
                        
                              
                           





      (3) 
 
Where: 
N(x) denotes the cumulative distribution function for a standard normal random variable (i.e. 
the probability that a normal random variable with mean zero and variance of one is less than 
or equal to x)13.  
G(z) denotes the inverse cumulative distribution function for a standard normal random 
variable (i.e. the value of x such that N(x) = z). 
And: 
                 (4) 
 
                 (5) 
 
With the above formulas and the data given in the case we can compute the correlation, the 








2. The Almond Hill real estate loan 
Five C’s + One 
Character 
With the available information we should start by analyzing the loan initially made to Almond 
Hill through the 5 C’s + 1; Character, Capital, Capacity, Conditions, Collateral and Cycle. This 
allows us to understand more thoroughly the problem faced by the Millennium bcp directors in 
July, 2011. 
                                                          
13 The normal cumulative distribution function and the inverse of the normal cumulative distribution function are, for 
example, available in Excel as the functions NORM.S.DIST and NORM.S.INV. 
 
                
      
     
    
  
 
   
                 
       
                         
 
                   
             
          
         
               
          
  
                                               
                          
                                  
                          





José Águas, the company’s main and most active partner, had a lot of experience in the real 
estate development industry. He had been successful as an individual real estate entrepreneur 
and, at the time the loan was requested, was shifting his business to the company. This may 
show that Águas is probably very committed to the success of Almond Hill. Moreover, the 
remaining partners were also reliable clients of Millennium bcp. Finally, they all had very good 
skills, especially Águas, as real estate promoters, having been successful in building and selling 
top quality developments in the past.  
It is important to understand why the above strengths and the weaknesses that may be found 
are so relevant for the credit decision. This type of information gives the bank important signals 
about the borrower’s creditworthiness. In fact, it is core information that is used by banks in 
their models for determining PD’s. Also, given the nature of the deal, a real estate loan with the 
collateral we will further analyze, the skill and reliability of management is of the utmost 
importance. 
Capacity and Capital 
We face three problems in the capacity and capital analysis. Firstly, if we wish to analyze the 
merits of the decision in 2006, our information about the company’s financials prior to 2006 is 
limited. Secondly, in 2006 Almond Hill had only been incorporated for 2 years. Finally, because 
the company is not submitted to strict disclosure rules, we do not have any information about 
cash-flow. Nevertheless, as we will see further, these problem are mitigated by the conditions of 
the loan and collateral. However, we can assume, but never forgetting that it is an assumption, 
that because by the end of 2006 the debt protection ratios were very high, 7,71 EBITDA/interest 
expense and 6,62 EBIT/interest expense, when the loan was being approved, those same ratios 
were also high and therefore there was still room for more debt service. 
According to the bank’s information, in 2005 Almond Hill had loans amounting to € 4.636.119, 
of witch € 2.198.340 where from the Millennium bcp group, and equity of € 600.000. Capital is 
another important signal when a loan is being analyzed. It shows the financial commitment of 
management and gives the bank the assurance that the borrower also has something at stake 
and is not in a riskless position. 
Conditions 
In this real estate development loan, where historical information on the company and future 
performance projections are limited, the conditions of the loan have core importance and have 
to be carefully drawn, in order for the loan to be approved. 
The €10 million loan with a 4 year maturity had an initial availability of only € 1 million. The 
following availability would depend on the bank’s inspection of the evolution of the 
development. The more the development was completed, the more of the loan would be 
available. This ensured that the outstanding amount was always covered by the value of the 
collateral (analyzed further). Regarding the payment of principal, this would have to be done 
with the signing of each deed signed by the promissory purchaser, making the repayment of the 
loan dependent on the success of the company. That is, if the company experienced more 
success than it expected the loan would be fully repaid sooner. We can see that the conditions of 
the loan were designed so as to guarantee the banks position. It did not allow availability of the 






The collateral of the loan in this case is deeply related to the conditions of the loan and to the 
problems we have mentioned above. Initially, the loan had an availability of €1 million, 
collateralized, free of covenants and encumbrances, by the real estate worth €3,3 million. The 
initial LVT was hence 30% and final LVT was projected to be 47%, for the €10 million loan and 
collateral worth €21 million.  
It is easy to see that the bank seems to be reducing the risk significantly with the above. There 
are however two interrelated issued that must be taken into account. The value of the collateral, 
being the value of the apartments built, is subject to a cyclical downturn in the economy and in 
the real estate market. Moreover, the assets are highly correlated since they all belong to the 
same development and have exactly the same characteristics; hence, their value is likely to 
move in the same direction. When banks assess LGD’s they try to determine, the downturn 
scenario, but even this values might not capture the real worst case scenario. The risk-
management analysis must not depend only on the models, even if they are very sophisticated. 
Cycle 
We should recognize that at the time the loan was approved economic and business conditions 
were very favorable. Algarve real housing prices rose 3,14%, Portuguese real GDP grew by 
14,4%, and interest rates were low. The market for this type of development was growing, not 
only because of Portuguese demand but also because of increasing demand from Spain and 
from Northern European countries. The smaller vacation home segment in Algarve was 
flourishing and there was still not much supply for this type of apartments, which meant that 
there was still a lot of growth opportunity. With hindsight we can see that a global financial 
crisis in 2007/2008 followed by a sovereign debt crisis in Europe suggest that this type of 
business was not as promising as it seemed and was being fueled by economic growth that 
would end very soon and in a very hard way. However, we must not forget that at the time this 
was not foreseeable by most and the tourist real estate market in the Algarve seemed to have a 
bright future. 
Finally, it is very important to mention other factors that might be influencing this decision and 
that are also important to take into account in any credit lending decision. Although the risk-
management function focuses on the bank’s risk exposure and on managing that risk, not 
allowing the bank to enter into deals which are riskier than desirable, there is always pressure 
coming from the commercial functions. The commercial side will tend to insist on the client 
relationship importance of any deal. In this case, for instances, it seems that Almond Hill and 
Águas are key in the Albufeira branch’s performance. Additionally, at the time of the loan is 
being analyzed, we can see considerable pressure from two of Millennium bcp’s competitors, 
which may increase the bias towards the approval of a deal with clients of this importance. 
 
3. Extending the maturity of the loan vs. initiating the recovery process 
The credit recovery process 
Torino and his peers are facing a problem with two alternative solutions, the extension of the 
loan or a recovery process. These seem to be the only options available, so we should analyze 
what the advantages or disadvantages of initiating the recovery process are, as opposed to 





If the Millennium bcp directors decided not to approve the extension and consequently to go 
ahead with the recovery process that would lead to legal proceedings, the value of the collateral 
seems to exceed by far the outstanding amount of the loan. The LVT is 40,79%, for a € 3.821.040 
loan, which means that if they are able to sell the collateral they will easily cover the amount 
owed. The value of the collateral could even be reduced as much as 59,2% from € 9.368.000 to € 
3.821.040 and the outstanding amount would still be covered (not considering unpaid interests). 
Nevertheless, the problem and key factor in the credit recovery process is the Portuguese legal 
framework and legal system, for two reasons. Firstly, the collateral is the first mortgage on the 
apartments not yet sold, free of covenants and encumbrances, and this means that if the bank 
wishes to execute the collateral because of Almond Hills default, it does not gain automatic 
ownership of the apartments. Millennium bcp will have to initiate legal proceeding in a civil 
executive court so that the collateral may be sold and, with the proceedings of this sale, the debt 
be paid. It seems clear that in this case the problem is the same as before; the difficulty in selling 
the assets. Moreover, Almond Hill’s managers are more likely to be able to better sell the 
apartments since they are highly skilled in real estate promotion and very familiar with the 
market. The second reason is that, even if Millennium bcp decided that it was still a better 
option to file legal proceedings, it would have to go through the sluggish Portuguese legal 
system. Recent studies from the Ministry of Justice14 show that the average executive law suit 
takes on average 43 months, a number that has been increasing since 2005. There are even 6% of 
law suits that take 8 or more years to be finish. These numbers show that, although the average 
life time of an executive law suit varies from region to region, it cannot be seen as a viable 
solution and may turn out to be a last resort. 
This type of decision, as in this case, can be seriously influenced by other issues, such as the 
economic and political context the bank is in. At the time the loan is being analyzed, 
Millennium bcp is struggling against the severe shockwaves of the European sovereign debt 
crisis. On top of seeing its borrowing costs skyrocket and its share price plummet, it is under 
pressure to provision against big losses from sovereign bonds in its balance sheet and, 
consequently, to inject more equity in order to have a bigger buffer against those hypothetical 
losses. This may deter the bank from recognizing losses from other assets, such as those related 
to the real estate market. For instances, if the bank were to start a recovery process on the 
Almond Hill loan and with it recover less than it expected, it may just be that it would have to 
assume that its credit assessment models, although very sophisticated, are not actually 
capturing the risk the bank is facing and the value the assets are worth in an actual downturn 
scenario. Also, if the recovery process was initiated, the losses incurred would have to be 
recognized. This would have an adverse impact on the banks equity, precisely at a time when 
regulators are raising pressure for the increase of the equity buffer and when raising capital in 
capital markets is revealing to be more complicated every day, due to the Portuguese economic 
situation and to the evolution of the bank’s share price. 
Finally, it is never too much to recall the importance of client relationship in these cases. 
Almond Hill and its main partner are very important and profitable (until now) clients with 
whom the bank will try to maintain a long-term relationship. Extending the loan and avoiding a 
recovery process will probably have the support and pressure of the commercial side of any 
bank and will only be seen as a last resort measure. 
                                                          
14
 Estatíticas sobre acções executivas cíveis (2005-2010), Boletim de informação estatística 3, Maio 2011, Direcção-Geral da 





What to gain from extending the loan 
We have concluded that with the Almond Hill loan, initiating a recovery process is not an 
option given the circumstances. However, in spite of the strong position that the real estate 
developer is in because of the fact that the bank does not have alternatives, the latter cannot 
extend the loan without any demands. This is an opportunity for the bank to negotiate the 
terms and conditions of the loan. Millennium bcp can for example demand other collateral that 
the company might have and that is less correlated with the assets that already serve as 
collateral. We saw in the case that Almond Hill also has some developments in the Portuguese 
Zona Oeste. Also, the banks can demand, if they do not already exist, personal guarantees from 
the managers, which is a good way of avoiding excessive risk taking from the company, the 
increase of the spread , which given the circumstances will likely happen, the conditions under 
which interest and principal are paid, or any other terms that may be relevant. 
WHAT HAPPENED 
After considerable discussion, the Committee chose to approve the credit extension. The spread 
was raised to 5,5% and the conditions set out by the credit analyst were imposed by the bank. 
Firstly, the interests that were due had to be paid within 90 days, secondly, when the two deeds 
in standby were signed, Almond Hill would have to pay in each of the signings, on top of the 
amortization, 50% of the interest due at the time, and thirdly, the extension of the loan was 
conditioned to the full coverage of the overdraft the company had. 
Between July and December the country’s economy continued to deteriorate and by the end of 
the year a deep recession was expected. Prospects for 2012 were also very gloomy. Residential 
housing prices continued to fall both in the country in general and in the Algarve in particular. 
Europe did not find a solution for its sovereign debt crisis and in fact things continued to get 
worse, with significant events, like changes in government and the increase of the cost of 
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